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We replicate the analysis of the connection between Japanese sectoral productivity 
growth and industrial policy performed by Beason and Weinstein (1996) of national 
accounts data for the period 1992 to 1999. We show that despite some positive raw 
correlations between growth and industrial policy tools, there is no robust association 
between growth and industrial policy in the 1990s. This is consistent with the conclusions 
of Beason and Weinstein for the high-growth period (1960-1973). We also confirm the 
development of some trends evident in the previous data, such as the skewed distribution 
of policy instrument application to politically influential industries and the inconsistent 
application of different instruments to industries. Overall, the data is much more 
consistent with a theory of Japanese industrial policy as a product of political economy 
than industrial policy as a response to growth and productivity. 
                                                
1 Maxim Pinkovskiy is a senior at Columbia College, Columbia University, studying economics and mathematics.  He can be contacted at 
mlp2005@columbia.edu. 
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Introduction: 
As Japan grew to exceed the U.S. in per capita GDP in the 1980s, scholars attributed its rise to the 
politically-uninfluenced use of policy instruments – low-interest loans, tax relief, subsidies, and protection – 
in order to transfer resources out of stagnating business sectors and into sectors with high growth and 
increasing returns to scale (Tyson and Zysman, 1990). This view informed much of U.S. trade policy 
towards Japan, and some of its leading proponents (Tyson) were appointed to influential positions in the 
U.S. government. Beason and Weinstein (1996) argue that such a view of Japanese industrial policy is 
mistaken; in particular, that 1) there is, if any, a negative association between Japanese sectoral productivity 
growth and the amount of targeting a sector receives, and 2) application of industrial policy tools is heavily 
skewed to politically influential sectors. We replicate the analysis of the connection between Japanese 
sectoral productivity growth and industrial policy performed by Beason and Weinstein (1996) over national 
accounts data for the period 1992 to 1999. Owing to the dismal performance of the Japanese economy 
during that period, the question of whether the Japanese government was targeting increasing-returns 
industries is no longer interesting; rather, we wish to investigate whether Beason and Weinstein’s 
conclusions remain valid for the 1990s, our provisional hypothesis being that there is no positive association 
between favorable application of industrial policy to a sector and its productivity growth. 
We show that despite some positive raw correlations between growth and industrial policy tools, 
there is no robust association between growth and industrial policy in the 1990s, as is consistent with the 
conclusions of Beason and Weinstein for the high-growth period (1960-1973). We also confirm the 
development of some trends evident in the previous data, such as the skewed distribution of policy 
instrument application to politically influential industries and the inconsistent application of different 
instruments to industries. Overall, the data is much more consistent with a theory of Japanese industrial 
policy as a product of political economy than industrial policy as a response to growth and productivity 
 
Discussion of Beason and Weinstein (1996): 
 A traditional approach in the study of the effects of Japanese industrial policy was to consider the 
effects of specific policies on specific firms or industries through case studies. Beason and Weinstein (1996) 
argue that a superior approach considers the effect of the favorability of industrial policy relative to the 
mean policy across industries, or alternatively, the extent to which some sectors receive access to low-
interest loans or to tax relief over and above what other sectors receive. Beason and Weinstein reason that 
the essence of “picking winners” consists not merely in aiding favored sectors, but in granting them 
treatment that other sectors do not enjoy since it is the relative differentials in profitability between sectors 
that drive movements of factors of production, labor and capital, from one sector into another. Using 
regression as well as simple correlation measures, Beason and Weinstein show that while Japanese industrial 
policy induced factors to flow to favored industries, the favorability of sectoral industrial policy had a 
negative association both with sectoral productivity growth and long-run sectoral output growth. This 
conclusion challenged the prevailing view that Japanese industrial policy was a significant element in the 
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Japanese postwar economic miracle, and suggested that policy favoritism served more to support 
unproductive but politically important sectors, rather than foster productivity growth in emerging ones. 
 
Data and Variable Definitions: 
 In replicating Beason and Weinstein (1996), we obtain data from the same sources they used, 
which we list in the data appendix. We restrict our attention to low-interest loans from the Japan 
Development Bank (JDB), tax rates, and subsidies, and ignore the use of tariffs and quotas. We justify this 
omission by noting that 1) it would be extremely difficult to generate measures of tariff rates comparable to 
those used in Beason and Weinstein, since their source (Shouda (1982)) does not extend to the 1990s and 
would require out-of-sample extrapolation, and 2) it is reasonable to assume that protection is negligible in 
Japan owing to trade liberalization in the wake of the Uruguay Round.2 However, since the data contains 
relevant information on multiple non-manufacturing industries, (non-manufacturing industries are expected 
to be more important in the 1990s than in the high-growth period owing to the transition to a service 
economy), and since the rise of non-manufacturing industries may affect the use of industrial policy tools, 
we include data for all available industry categories of the private sector.3 
 The key variables used in the analysis are defined as follows: sectoral gross domestic product is 
value added per sector in each year, deflated to 1990. Fraction JDB is the ratio of outstanding JDB loans to 
total outstanding loans within a sector. Tax Rate is the ratio of corporate tax rates to taxable income, while 
subsidy rate is the negative of the ratio of net tax receipts from a sector to its gross domestic product.4 The 
labor share is the ratio of employment compensation to GDP, and the capital share is the difference 
between unity and the labor share. Growth is computed as the difference of logs of the lead and the current 
value of a variable.  Productivity growth is computed according to the Tornqvist formula, as the difference 
in GDP growth and the sum of factor growths weighted by the average factor shares in the lead and current 
period. In order to look at relative policy favorability towards sectors, we follow Beason and Weinstein, and 
transform the policy variables into deviations from their yearly economy-wide average values. 
 
Descriptive Data: 
We first consider summary tables of the data and compare them to Table 1 of Beason and 
Weinstein (1996). Table 1.1 shows the average values and ranks of growth and industrial policy variables 
for all sectors under analysis. Looking at growth, one immediately sees the noticeable slowdown during the 
1990s in comparison with the 1980s. Only electrical machinery and finance grow at 1980s levels, while all 
other manufacturing sectors grow at no more than 3% (lower than the median growth for 1980s), and 
many shrink outright. Among sectors that declined are those with heavy government support, such as 
                                                
2 This assumption comes from conversation with Prof. Weinstein 
3 We also added an aggregate “Manufacturing” sector in order to compute aggregate quantities for differencing. It is 
excluded in all correlations and regressions. 
4 Since the Subsidy Rate is a cross-section ratio, it is formed using quantities that are not deflated. All variable 
definitions follow Beason and Weinstein (1996), or were created with assent of Prof. Weinstein. 
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agriculture, mining, textiles, and construction. However, some of the declined sectors, such as general 
machinery, used to be among the high-growing sectors of the 1980s. A possible explanation may be that 
most sectors suffered from the economy-wide negative effects of the banking crisis, while electrical 
machinery and finance were able to offset some of these effects owing to the global finance and 
technological boom. A similar pattern is present in the productivity growth data: the only significant growth 
in productivity is in electrical machinery, automobiles, and finance. The decent productivity growth in 
finance confirms the continuation of an upward trend in the productivity of Japanese finance noted in 
Weinstein (2001). 
Looking at the application of industrial policy tools, one sees that the distribution of the application 
of the policy instruments is highly skewed, a result consistent with Beason and Weinstein (1996). Mining is 
heavily favored with tax breaks, just as petroleum, transport and communications, and utilities are heavily 
favored with JDB loans. Construction, agriculture, and finance are favored with subsidies. (It is likely that 
the “subsidies” received by finance reflect bank recapitalization in the wake of the financial crises of the 
1990s).5 However, while in the high-growth period, some sectors appear to have been winners in the 
application of all or most policy tools; in the 1990s data, large gainers from some policy tools do not seem to 
receive favored treatment across the board, and often are large losers in the application of other tools. This 
is particularly evident in the differential application of JDB loans versus tax relief (taxes and subsidies). For 
instance, mining receives by far the largest tax breaks, but no longer has first or second rank with respect to 
JDB loans or subsidies, while transport and public utilities, though almost completely funded by the JDB, 
are in next-to-last place with respect to taxes. Similarly, petroleum refining, which receives the highest 
proportion of JDB loans among manufacturing firms, has the lowest subsidy rate. Textiles and processed 
food, which used to be large gainers from trade policy, do not appear to be especially favored with the 
industrial policy tools under consideration. This pattern suggests an inconsistency in the application of 
industrial policy tools if one considers the aim of the government to be to transfer resources to specific 
industries (for growth or political economy reasons) and if one considers the application of different policy 
tools to be fungible. This pattern can be explained if one considers that sectors prefer the application of 
certain tools to others (it is plausible, for instance, that some sectors may value easy credit more than tax 
breaks), and if sectors must negotiate for preferred treatment by the government in an environment of 
increasingly scarce government funds. 
In contrast to the similar data from the high-growth period, it is no longer apparent that a negative 
correlation exists between growth and the industrial policy measures. Rank seems to be unassociated with 
GDP or productivity growth, and high-ranking sectors in terms of industrial policy are represented among 
the fast and the slow growers. When one considers the pure correlations between growth and industrial 
policy measures, presented in Table 1.2, one is surprised to see that JDB loans are positively correlated with 
GDP growth, while tax rate differentials and subsidy rates are positively correlated with productivity 
                                                
5 The relatively low ranking of agriculture in terms of low-interest loans may be explained by the fact that agriculture 
receives low-interest loans from governmental financial institutions other than the JDB: there exists, for instance, the 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Financial Corporation (Doi 2005) 
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growth. One does note, however, that while this observation is very surprising in light of Beason and 
Weinstein (1996), it is not indicative of causal links between growth and industrial policy. In fact, since JDB 
loans and tax rate differentials are negatively correlated, it may be the positive correlation of JDB loans with 
growth is driven by the loans serving as a proxy for the absence of tax breaks and subsidies. The negative 
correlation between JDB loans and tax rate differentials also substantiates the observation that sectors 
favored with easy lending are disfavored in terms of tax breaks and vice versa. Therefore, one must use 
regression analysis to disentangle the partial correlations between growth and industrial policy and to make 












































100 Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries 
200 Mining 
300 Manufacturing 
310 Foodstuffs and Beverages 
320 Textile Products 
331 Chemical and Allied Products 
332 Petroleum Refining 
333 Ceramic, Stone and Clay Products 
341 Iron and Steel 
342 Fabricated Metal Products 
351 General Machinery 
352 Electrical Machinery Equipment and Supplies 
353 Transportation Equipment 
354 Precision Instruments and Machinery 
400 Construction 
500 Wholesale and Retail Trade, Eating & Drinking Places 
600 Finance and Insurance 
700 Real Estate 
800 Services 
901 Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply and Water 
902 Transport and Communications 









Table 1.1:  









JDB Tax Rate 
Subsidy 
Rate 
        
352 1 7.96  (1) 6.38  (1) -0.89  (9) 2.62  (2) 0.87  (6) 
600 2 1.60  (3) 3.18  (2) -3.57  (21) 2.59  (6) 7.13  (1) 
800 3 -1.67  (12) 2.43  (3) -2.40  (13) -0.95  (16) 2.07  (4) 
353 4 2.33  (2) 2.31  (4) -0.21  (7) 2.62  (2) -0.48  (13) 
902 5 0.17  (5) 2.17  (5) 20.85  (2) -1.35  (19) -0.21  (11) 
901 6 -2.08  (15) 2.12  (6) 81.10  (1) -1.35  (19) -2.42  (16) 
500 7 -1.08  (9) 1.97  (7) -3.17  (18) -0.42  (15) -0.55  (14) 
700 8 -3.81  (21) 1.89  (8) -1.96  (11) -1.42  (21) 1.82  (5) 
332 9 -3.30  (19) 1.59  (9) 16.22  (3) -0.11  (12)    43.75  (21) 
331 10 -0.64  (8) 1.59  (10) 2.40  (4) -0.11  (12) -0.33  (12) 
300 11 0.57  (4) 0.47  (11) -0.50  (8) 0.71  (7) -5.02  (19) 
310 12 -2.53  (17) 0.01  (12) -2.35  (12) -1.04  (18)    23.88  (20) 
333 13 -1.12  (10) -1.35  (13) -1.37  (10) -0.11  (12) -1.61  (15) 
341 14 -1.88  (13) -1.84  (14) 1.57  (5) 0.42  (10) -3.27  (17) 
342 15 -2.04  (14) -2.27  (15) -2.80  (16) 0.42  (10) -0.08  (10) 
400 16 -3.76  (20) -2.58  (16) -3.50  (20) -0.97  (17) 2.46  (3) 
354 17 -0.19  (7) -2.61  (17) -3.26  (19) 2.62  (2) 0.54  (7) 
100 18 -2.47  (16) -2.80  (18) -3.17  (17) 0.47  (9) 3.35  (2) 
351 19 -2.89  (18) -2.98  (19) -2.78  (15) 2.62  (2) 0.17  (9) 
200 20 -1.59  (11) -3.11  (20) 0.31  (6) 14.07  (1) 0.18  (8) 
320 21 -0.07  (6) -4.63  (21) -2.61  (14) 0.64  (8) -3.96  (18) 
Notes: Numbers in the "Rank" column represents the average of the rank in all five categories.  All values in variable 
columns give growth rates for Tornqvist Productivity and GDP and  differences for other variables. The numbers in 
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GDP90 1    
Fraction 
JDB 0.1074 1   
Tax Rate -0.0628 -0.2011 1  
Subsidy 
Rate -0.0535 -0.1537 0.144 1 











Tornqvist 1    
Fraction 
JDB -0.0732 1   
Tax Rate 0.141 -0.2099 1  
Subsidy 
Rate 0.1054 -0.1439 0.1568 1 
Notes: All values are raw correlations.  Variables are the same as 




The model used by Beason and Weinstein (1996) involved regressing productivity growth on one- 
and five- year lags of the policy variable differentials. Since we are looking at a much shorter time period, 
and since the five-year lags (except on taxation) are insignificant in Beason and Weinstein’s regression with 
Tornqvist growth in all specifications, we regress productivity growth only on one-year lags of the policy 
variable differentials. From Table 2.1, we see that the regression results broadly sustain the hypothesis of no 
positive association between policy variables and productivity growth. All coefficients are insignificant, the 
null that all coefficients are jointly zero cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level, and the 
model explains only 2% of the variation. The magnitudes of the coefficients are even smaller than in 
Beason and Weinstein (1996), with only the coefficient on the tax differential being of the same order of 
magnitude as the Beason and Weinstein coefficients6. Therefore, one may conclude that the positive pure 
correlations observed earlier are products of noise, and that there is no true statistical association between 
productivity growth and the policy measures. A regression of GDP growth on the same variables (Table 
2.1.5) produces the same null result. 
                                                
6 Since Tornqvist growth is expressed as a percentage in this paper, and is expressed as a fraction in Beason and 
Weinstein (1996), all coefficients should be divided by 100 to be compared with the Beason and Weinstein results in 
Table 5. 
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One may legitimately ask whether the regression results are driven by sectors that are large 
winners or losers by a particular policy measure, since the distribution of the policy tool applications is 
extremely skewed. To account for this problem in their paper, Beason and Weinstein re-estimated the 
model with exactly one sector omitted in each estimation. Taking the same step, we observe that omitting 
any one sector has almost no effect on the magnitude, significance, or sign of the coefficients, as well as on 
the significance and explanatory power of the model (Table 2.2). The coefficients on JDB loan differentials 
and on the subsidy differentials are always trivial, while the coefficient on taxes ranges from .14 to .21, 
which would suggest that tax relief of 5% relative to the average tax level should increase productivity by 
1%, but is always insignificant at even the 10% level. The one exception to this pattern is the exclusion of 
mining (Table 3), which received large tax breaks and had mediocre (small negative) productivity growth 
during the relevant period. In the regression where mining is excluded, the coefficient on the tax rate is 0.8 
and is significant at the 1% level. Nonetheless, while the specification is significant at the 5% level and 
explains 6% of the variation. We performed a similar exercise on the regression of GDP growth on the 
policy variables (tables not reproduced), and obtained a full confirmation of the original null result. 
The change in regression results upon the omission of mining is a potentially important indicator 
of an underlying connection between tax rate differentials and productivity growth. However, looking at 
Table 1.1, one sees that the positive association between tax rate differentials and productivity growth may 
be driven by a few observations that may be the result of an imperfection of the data. The top two sectors 
by productivity growth, electrical machinery and automobiles, are classed as “machinery manufacturing” in 
the National Tax Office data, and “machinery manufacturing” is a modest winner in terms of tax relief in 
the 1990s. However, not all sectors in “machinery manufacturing” exhibit strong productivity growth. 
General machinery has the fourth lowest performance, while precision instruments has only the seventh 
highest. Therefore, it is entirely possible that most of the tax relief went to general machinery, and is being 
mistakenly attributed to having gone to electrical machinery and automobiles. Such an interpretation is 
plausible from a political economy perspective when one considers that general machinery was one of the 
fastest-growing industries in the high-growth period and was one of the slowest-growing industries in the 
1990s. Failure in the sector probably resulted in a severe disappointment of expectations for owners of 
factors (labor and capital) invested in the sector, so the government may have pressed to aid general 
machinery. To see if these considerations matter for the exercise at hand, we estimate our specification over 
all sectors except mining and electrical machinery, and from Table 3 Model 3.2, obtain a significant 
coefficient of 0.5 on the tax differential, while the regression as a whole is no longer significant. Excluding 
all sectors in machinery manufacturing (Table 3 Model 3.3), we see that the tax differential coefficient loses 
significance. Therefore, if the above explanation of the unusually high tax break apparently given to 
electrical machinery and automobiles is correct, there is no significant positive association between tax 
differentials and productivity growth, and the hypothesis is sustained. 
 To conclude, we follow Beason and Weinstein (1996) in estimating the specification separately for 
sectors whose overall (not just productivity) growth was above and below the median. From Table 3 Model 
3.4, we see that slow growers have similar results to Table 2.1, while fast growers (Table 3 Model 3.5) have 
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similar results to Table 2.2, from which mining was excluded. Considering the same logic as in the previous 
paragraph, we look at the specification estimated over all fast growers not in machinery manufacturing 
(Table 3 Model 3.6), and obtain the same results as in Table 3 Model 3.2. Therefore, if machine 
manufacturing, with its likely mistake in representing tax breaks given to general machinery as tax breaks 
given to electrical machinery, is removed from the data, there are no significant differences in the 

















   
JDB (1) -0.005 0.032 
 (0.20) (1.41) 
Tax Rate (1) 0.198 -0.210 
 (1.38) (0.21) 
Subsidy Rate (1) 0.038 -0.360 
 (0.89) (0.36) 
Constant -0.988 -0.250 
  (1.90) (0.25) 
   
Number of Obs 180 200 
R2 0.003 0.059 
F 1.15 1.15 
     Notes: All values are the result of regressions using 
OLS.  For each variable, the coefficient is the upper 
value, and the absolute value of the t-statistic is in 
parenthesis below.  For variables, the number in 
parenthesis indicates the amount of lag between the 
recorded variable value and its effect on the dependent 
variable, in months. 
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TABLE 2.2 
Regression Results for Productivity with Sectors Omitted 
Variable Main 100 200 300 310 320 331 332 
         
Diff JDB (1) -0.005 -0.008 0.011 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.200) (0.320) (0.450) (0.200) (0.230) (0.180) (0.200) (0.120) 
Diff Tax (1) 0.198 0.183 0.807 0.198 0.195 0.192 0.198 0.194 
 (1.380) (1.270) (2.990) (1.380) (1.320) (1.350) (1.360) (1.350) 
Diff Subsidy (1) 0.038 0.046 0.034 0.038 0.033 0.037 0.038 0.039 
  (0.890) (1.060) (0.820) (0.890) (0.680) (0.880) (0.880) (0.480) 
         
Number Obs 180 171 171 180 171 171 171 171 
R2 0.020 0.020 0.060 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.02 
F 1.150 1.250 3.690 1.150 0.930 1.110 1.140 0.85 
                  
Variable Main 333 341 342 351 352 353 354 
         
Diff JDB (1) -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.200) (0.200) (0.230) (0.210) (0.270) (0.040) (0.170) (0.180) 
Diff Tax (1) 0.198 0.197 0.187 0.21 0.207 0.144 0.182 0.191 
 (1.380) (1.340) (1.320) (1.420) (1.440) (1.090) (1.260) (1.300) 
Diff Subsidy (1) 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.04 0.025 0.037 0.038 
  (0.890) (0.880) (0.940) (0.860) (0.950) (0.650) (0.860) (0.870) 
         
Number Obs 180 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
R2 0.020 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
F 1.150 1.12 1.15 1.19 1.29 0.65 1 1.03 
         
Variable Main 400 500 600 700 800 901 902 
         
Diff JDB (1) -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 0.04 -0.009 
 (0.200) (0.360) (0.200) (0.110) (0.320) (0.210) (0.480) (0.350) 
Diff Tax (1) 0.198 0.156 0.195 0.205 0.162 0.194 0.194 0.217 
 (1.380) (1.050) (1.320) (1.390) (1.100) (1.300) (1.330) (1.470) 
Diff Subsidy (1) 0.038 0.046 0.038 0.028 0.043 0.039 0.051 0.034 
  (0.890) (1.050) (0.860) (0.640) (1.000) (0.880) (1.050) (0.780) 
         
Number Obs 180 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
R2 0.020 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
F 1.150 1.06 1.09 0.93 1.04 1.09 1.08 1.25 
     Notes: All values are the result of regressions using OLS.  For each variable, the coefficient is the upper value, and the 
absoulte t-statistic is in parenthesis below.  Bold values are significant to 1%. For variables, the number in parenthesis 
indicates the amount of lag between the recorded variable value and its effect on the dependent variable, in months.  The 
number above the results indicates the excluded sector.  The results for all sectors is repeated in each row for comparison. 
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Table 3 





No Mining and 
Electrical 
Machinery 






Model 3.5  
Fast Growers 




       
JDB (1) 0.011 0.008 0.007 -0.048 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.450) (0.370) (0.310) (0.120) (0.010) (0.050) 
Tax Rate (1) 0.807 0.502 0.482 0.153 1.019 0.473 
 (2.990) (1.960) (1.520) (0.910) (2.820) (1.280) 
Subsidy Rate (1) 0.034 0.026 0.028 -0.046 0.057 0.045 
 (0.820) (0.710) (0.780) (0.520) (1.210) (1.160) 
Constant -1.120 -1.486 -1.436 -2.310 -0.073 -0.888 
  (2.250) (3.230) (2.930) (1.910) (0.100) (1.320) 
       
Number of Obs 171 162 135 90 90 72 
R2 0.062 0.030 0.023 0.011 0.123 0.049 
F 3.69 1.65 1.070 0.320 4.050 1.170 
     Notes: All values are the result of regressions using OLS.  For each variable, the coefficient is the upper value, and the absolute 
valule of the t-statistic is in parenthesis below.  Bolded values are significant at least at the 5% level. For variables, the number in 







 We observe that the fundamental result of Beason and Weinstein (1996) – the lack of a positive 
association between productivity growth and policy tool application – remains valid during the recession of 
the 1990s. In particular, while Beason and Weinstein (1996) found a negative association between tax rates 
and productivity, we find differences in policy across sectors to be largely irrelevant for productivity growth 
outcomes. Beason and Weinstein explain such negative associations in part by arguing that governments 
aid declining sectors to avoid the dislocation that follows their collapse. Since such considerations should 
become particularly salient in a recession, it is surprising that we do not observe negative correlations. One 
may conjecture that the political economy of Japanese transfers in the 1990s depended not only on the 
desire of governments not to disappoint expectations, but also on factors unrelated to current industry 
growth, such as political influence of given sectors. Such an explanation may be plausible, since it is known 
that certain sectors – agriculture, mining and textiles – have been consistently favored by the Japanese 
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government for most of the postwar period, and have developed powerful advocacy groups in government 
for their interests.7  
 Our confirmation of Beason and Weinstein (1996) provides further evidence that the fundamental 
insight of this paper about the political economy of industrial policy holds true. Contrary to popular 
accounts, government is not observed to transfer resources from stagnating sectors into growing sectors, to 
correct market inefficiencies that may arise in sectors with increasing returns to scale, or to improve long-
run growth. Rather, government sets taxes, subsidies, and favorable loans according to political necessity in 
cushioning the losses of investors in declining industries, or in responding to the wishes of organized and 
influential sectors. These observations question the currently accepted public finance theoretical framework 
in which government is viewed as a benevolent agent attempting to maximize social welfare subject to the 
constraints of using particular policy instruments,8 and suggest instead that government is a bargaining 
process between groups competing for preferential treatment, with holders of formal power concerned far 
more with ensuring reelection and strengthening political support than with long-term economic efficiency. 
Ultimately, these results call for treating government intervention in the marketplace in public finance 
models as they treat supply and demand – all three should be seen as arising from the optimizing behavior 
of agents under resource or institutional constraints. Such a modeling approach would preclude seeing 
government policies as free variables that can be altered by policymakers at will, and rather consider them 
as part of a politico-economic equilibrium, in which only changes in the fundamental parameters of the 
market or political structure will lead to changes in policy. 
                                                
7 It is well-known that the LDP, Japan’s most powerful party, sees agricultural workers as some of its key constituents. 
8 See e.g. the utilitarian paradigm in public finance, originating with Mirrlees (1971):  
Mirrlees, J.A. (1971). “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation.” Review of Economic Studies, 38: 175-
208 
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Data Appendix: 
All data is annual and sectoral. 
VALUE ADDED (GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT): Annual Report on National Accounts, ESRI 2005. Data 
downloaded from http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html  on 04/08/07. Data deflated by the GDP 
deflator provided to the price level of 1990. 
 
EMPLOYMENT: Annual Report on National Accounts, ESRI 2005. Data downloaded from 
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html  on 04/08/07. The calendar year table is used to avoid 
discrepancies with the rest of the data. 
 
GROSS CAPITAL STOCK: Japan Statistical Yearbook, Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, 
Government of Japan, 1992-2003. The primary source of the data is the Capital Stock of Private Enterprises, 
published by ESRI (used by Beason and Weinstein (1996). 
 
TAXABLE INCOME AND CORPORATION TAXES: Japan Statistical Yearbook, Statistics Bureau, 
Management and Coordination Agency, Government of Japan, 1995-2005. The primary source of the data is the 
Sampling Survey of Corporations, which is used by Beason and Weinstein (1996). The survey assigned to 
each year is the survey that is begun during that year. 
 
SUBSIDIES: Computed as the negative of the ratio of net sectoral taxes less subsidies to sectoral gross 
domestic product. All data from Annual Report on National Accounts, ESRI 2005. 
 
JDB LOANS: Economic Statistics Monthly, Research and Statistics Division, Bank of Japan, 1990-1999, all issues for 
the month of February. Fraction JDB loans computed as ratio of total loans outstanding to the sector from 
the JDB over the total loans outstanding to the sector from domestically registered banks. 
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